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ABSTRACT 
During the last decades, frame analysis has become a preferred concept in political communi-
cation to understand underlying beliefs and motives in public conflicts. The study of conflicts 
on labor market reforms even longer is of pivotal concern for several other social science sub-
disciplines, e.g., the research on the welfare state or neo-corporatist institutions. However, it 
is astonishing that there not more attempts to analyze the framing processes driving the poli-
tics of employment relations. Starting from the assumptions that the study of framing can re-
veal a lot about the dynamics of political struggles on employment relations, this paper ex-
plores whether frame patterns follow distinct historic legacies of the single countries, or 
whether framing is a function of the core beliefs of the relevant actors in the debate on em-
ployment relations (public authorities, interest associations, parties and business organiza-
tions). The analysis relies on newspaper content analysis data collected from 2004 until 2006 
in the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria. A first finding is that 
the framing of employment relations varies across countries mainly as expected by the com-
parative political economy literature. Furthermore, the results show that a simple bifurcation 
between left and right is not enough to explain framing differences among actors with regard 
to employment relations, but that the actors additionally have to be discerned between main-
stream and challengers. 
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1 Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of The Swiss Political Science Association Feb. 2./3., 
University of Lucerne, 2012. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policy making is a process of social learning, in which conﬂicts on ideas and values 
play a crucial role (Hall, 1993). In today’s established democracy, these ideational conﬂicts 
are increasingly carried out in mass-mediated public debates, making them the crucial arena 
for social learning (Sniderman, 2000, p. 75). In this paper, we will discover the role of ideas 
and values in the public debate on employment relations by means of a frame analysis of 
newspaper articles in six Western European countries (the U.K., France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Switzerland and Austria). Frames have become a crucial tool to understand the un-
derlying mechanisms shaping ideas in public debates and thus politics in general (Scheff, 
2005) and we have strong evidence of the importance of frames in opinion formation process-
es in policy domains as diverse as immigration, abortion, welfare, or europeanization (Ferree 
et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003; Helbling et al. 2010, Chong and Druckmann 2007). 
Since there is little known about the framing of employment relations, we will consider 
in the following why actors and countries differ in framing conflicts over labor market issues. 
Ultimately, this allows revealing how ideologies are integrated into everyday political 
conﬂicts on labor market policies and the surrounding institutional agreements (Kriesi et al. 
2012). This analysis explores the impact of path dependency and actor characteristics on the 
use of specific frames to justify positions on labor market issues. On the one hand, we start 
from an institutionalist’s perspective and ask whether and how national peculiarities shape the 
competition for the dominant framing of employment relations. In establishing the linkage 
between institutions and the arguments used, the analysis thus reveals how the debate climate 
in different countries does systematically vary according to the historical development of the 
labor market regimes. On the other hand, this analysis scrutinizes which actors mobilize 
which particular problem definition they relate to which policy position. Instead of simply 
pitting policy positions of actors against each other, we may better understand why and how 
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employment relation reforms are criticized by analyzing the political actors’ reasoning about 
them. 
These questions will be addressed by focusing on the public arena as it is reflected by 
the sum of public communications related to employment relations (see, Helbling et al., 2011). 
We use the terms labor market issues and employment relations synonymously and deﬁne 
them in a fairly broad way as “all the behaviours, outcomes, practices, and institutions that 
emanate from or impinge on the [employment] relationship” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 45). More 
precisely, we assume that employment relations comprise the specific labor market policies 
such as wage agreements as well as the institutional settings where these policies are negotiat-
ed, decided, and implemented such as collective bargaining sites. Accordingly, the public 
debate on employment relations involves the communication process of a multitude of actors 
which relates to these policies and institutions. 
Already before the recent global economic meltdown, labor markets came to the fore in 
Western Europe. In the beginning of the 21st century, for instance, both the French and Ger-
man governments similarly tried to introduce broad labor market reforms. While the German 
government managed to implement the Agenda 2010 reform in 2003 despite ﬁerce protests 
from the radical left and unions, the French government withdrew its reform, the Contrat 
Première Embauche, in view of the conﬂicts with the labor movement in 2006. Moreover, the 
2005 Bolkestein directive, the attempt to liberalize the service sector within the Single Euro-
pean Market, was heavily criticized by the left to trigger a race to the bottom with regards to 
labor market regulations. 
The country sample pits the three biggest European economies, i.e. France, Germany 
and the U.K., against the three small Western European countries Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, and Austria. The three big economies have a pivotal role in the European economy 
which is manifest in the fact that, taken together, they are responsible for half of the European 
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Union’s gross domestic product (IMF, 2010). Beyond their pure economic strength, these 
countries differ with respect to their historical pathways of economic development. The three 
small economies, on the other hand, represent the group of coordinated, adaptive, and suc-
cessful Western European economies with a small workforce and high export market depend-
ency (see, Katzenstein, 1985). 
FRAMING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
Frames are “central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea 
elements” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 105). In a more instrumental perspective, frames serve as 
cognitive cues indicating agreement on basic principles and linking speciﬁc policy positions 
to collective beliefs and values (Surel, 2000; Helbling et al. 2011). Thus, by using a frame, a 
political actor clariﬁes how he deﬁnes a problem surrounding an issue and what its causal 
interpretation should be (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The mechanism of competition for the prevail-
ing frame among political actors is conceptualized in manyfold ways in the literature: as fram-
ing, priming, second-order agenda setting, or second-level agenda setting (Weaver 2007; 
Kiousis et al., 2006; Ferree et al., 2002; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, p. 63). Yet, all of these 
concepts share the central notion that the perceived importance of speciﬁc interpretations is 
crucial to the outcome of opinion making processes (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p. 115). 
Thus, we will examine the frames actors employ to manipulate the importance of specific 
aspects with respect to labor market issues.2 Moreover, the actors’ framing has to be con-
sistent with their core ideologies, since they need to establish a sustainable credibility in the 
public debate. 
As Entman (2004, p. 14) speciﬁes, the most successful frames are those “fully congru-
ent with schemas habitually used by most members of society”. With respect to employment 
relations in Western Europe, this resonance with central societal themes is most likely 
                                                 
2 Since the focus lies solely on the framing by the political elite, framing effects (i.e., how framing inﬂuences 
individuals’ attitudes; see, Brewer & Gross 2005) and journalistic framing (i.e., how messages are selected and 
reinterpreted by the media; see, Matthes 2007) are not considered in this contribution. 
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achieved by the pivotal ideologies that shaped the political economy since the beginnings of 
the modern state (Gartzke, 2007; Surel, 2000, p. 169f.). Table 1 presents these themes as de-
rived from the three historically dominant schools of thought: liberalism, mercantilism and 
socialism. While social democratic and liberal frames have been identified by previous ac-
counts of framing processes related to economic issues (see, Chong and Druckmann, 2007), 
this analysis adds the mercantilist arguments to the frames available to justify labor market 
issues. As will be discussed, mercantilist ideas were developed historically independent from 
social democratic and liberal ideas and are sometimes cross-cutting these two schools of 
thought. 
[table 1 about here] 
Systematic accounts of political economic thought started in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century U.K. (Skousen, 2001), since “the growth of a market society in the early nineteenth 
century was driven by the ideology of liberalism that found expression in [...] market dis-
course as the ‘common sense’ of the emerging capitalist system.” (Tarrow and Caporaso, 
2009, p. 595f.). The regulatory program of economic liberalism allowed to release the Euro-
pean economies from the formerly prevailing mercantilist structures (Pressman, 2006). Later 
on, the liberal core belief that free markets are the natural way to organize an economy was 
succumbed to the Social Democratic compromise after the disastrous experiences of the Great 
Depression. 
Sketched in very bold strokes, the liberal paradigm stands out by two central ideas 
which are listed as “economic freedom” and “prosperity” in table 1. On the one hand, its in-
herent notion of economic liberty justiﬁes both the emphasis of property rights and individual 
freedom as a basic human need (Kitschelt, 1994). On the other hand, classical liberalism 
stands out by the emphasis of prosperity: if individuals strive for success, the whole society 
proﬁts through the efficient allocation of resources by market mechanisms. 
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Liberalism was progressive with respect to its questioning of the mercantilist paradigm 
in pre-industrial Europe (Magnusson, 2003). Mercantilist doctrines started from the view that 
trade among nations is a zero-sum game and that states had to protect the own economy at the 
expenses of others (Ekelund and Tollison, 1982). In the nineteenth century, mercantilist theo-
ries were modiﬁed to comprehensive approaches regarding the role of the state in the econo-
my. Reinvented as neomercantilism, it became the theory of state dirigisme by which territo-
rial entities achieve economic wealth and political power (Immerwahr, 2009). Today, these 
ideas are still virulent in demands for the establishment of state-industrial complexes in stra-
tegic markets. The label “intervention” subsumes these ideas in the classification of table 1. 
Furthermore, neomercantilist thinking is also inﬂuential for regionalist approaches in interna-
tional politics such as the justiﬁcation of a common trade policy for the European Union 
(Hurrell, 1995; van Apeldoorn, 2002). This emphasis of a regional or national interest is de-
scribed by the second neomercantilist category (“protection”) in table 1. 
While classical liberalism tried to overcome mercantilist ideas, it itself got challenged 
from several inﬂuential leftist movements, ranging from revolutionary anarchists to moderate 
socialists (Pressman, 2006; King 2003; Lichtheim, 1969). In Western Europe, this thinking 
became embedded into the democratic system, manifest in the postwar compromise between 
labor and capital and the implementation of “social protections created to guard against the 
depredations that markets might cause” (Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009, p. 598). Accordingly, 
the main focus of social democratic ideas in Western European lies on correctives for the 
main ﬂaws of capitalism: social protection from the most acute hardships and respect of basic 
human rights beyond economic imperatives (“social justice” and “fairness” in table 1). 
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HOW TO EXPLAIN THE USE OF FRAMES 
To explain the use of frames, we propose to test theoretical arguments at two different 
levels. In a first step we will explore whether the framing of employment relations depends on 
the specific national contexts. To this aim, we consider hypotheses derived from a model of 
national divergence, which explains national framing differences recurring to distinct histori-
cal pathways of coordination and regulation at the country level. Along with the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) and welfare state regime literature, we therefore suppose that framing de-
pends on the national ideological imprint (Esping-Andersen 1998; Huber et al. 1993; Huber 
and Stephens 2001).  
We also take an actor-specific perspective and argue that differences in frame use can 
be explained by actor characteristics. Since the public is exposed to and chooses among com-
peting frames, actors are trying to inﬂuence which key organizing ideas are used for the eval-
uation of speciﬁc issues (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2009). Furthermore, we 
assume that actors employ frames in accordance with underlying structural potentials of the 
debate, i.e., they choose frames suited to their need to address specific interests such as the 
parties’ constituencies. We will therefore distinguish between left-right ideological positions 
and the divide between winners and losers which has emerged in consequence of post-
industrialisation and globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008; see also Keohane and Milner 1996). 
We will test all expected differences against the often found evidence of a policy 
change dominated by economically liberal ideas in Western European politics on employment 
relations which leads to an overall convergence of labour market regimes (Clayton and Pon-
tusson, 1998; Rhodes, 2001; Regini, 2003; Streeck, 2006; Vail, 2008; Baccaro and Simoni, 
2008). That means we assume liberal frames to prevail in the debates but nevertheless expect 
framing patterns to systematically vary as a function of country or actor characteristics. 
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THE DIVERGENCE MODEL 
Many influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy put the di-
vergent path thesis forward, a fundamental proposition being that differences among countries 
are persistent (Kitschelt, 1999, p. 444; Hays 2009, Hall and Soskice, 2001). In contrast, much 
of the early research on globalization and post-industrialization contest this claim, arguing 
that market internationalization is forcing advanced economies to converge onto a single ne-
oliberal model (e.g., Moses, 1994). A similar argument with respect to labour market policies 
was made by Jessop (1993), who argues that labour markets in Europe are continuously re-
shaped towards a workfare model. Inspired primarily by the U.S.A., countries would con-
verge as a consequence of the diffusion of the neoliberal policies according to which unem-
ployment is primary a behavioural problem and hence should be corrected by negative incen-
tives (sanctions). Yet, also more recent accounts of institutional change emphasize that there 
is a tendency to overstate the extent of continuous reproduction of existing institutional dif-
ferences (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The literature is thus far from an agreement how resili-
ent institutional configurations are, i.e. how strongly path dependency keeps advanced econ-
omies on diverging paths. 
Among the many conceptualizations of political-economic arrangements, an important 
attempt is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, distinguishing, first, the Liberal mar-
ket economies (LME) and second, the Coordinated market economies (CME) (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher, 2007). Whereas in LME like the U.K. the eco-
nomic players coordinate by means of competitive and hierarchical market arrangements, in 
CME the coordination of economic activities – for instance, industrial relations, security of 
employment, investor relations, or inter-firm negotiations – are based on non-market mecha-
nisms such as tripartite concertation. 
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The strength of the VoC approach lies in the acknowledgment of the importance, not 
only of the political, but also of the economic stakeholders within this policy domain. Howev-
er, it fails to acknowledge the role of the state in regulating and stabilizing the coordination 
mechanisms in labor market regimes adequately. Thus, this central player is re-introduced by 
Schmidt (2009), whose theoretical framework shows that the nature of state intervention is 
able to capture and explain part of the divergence among CEMs countries. In Schmidt com-
plement the VoC literature by including another distinction, the so-called State-Influenced 
Market Economies (SME), the government and administrations play a dominant role and in-
fluences the employment relations and the coordination efforts between the economic and the 
social partners, i.e. unions, employers and the state. A good example for SME countries is 
France, which is characterized by a centralized and autonomous, i.e., strong, state in Badie 
and Birnbaum’s (1983) understanding. In France, employment relations are heavily deter-
mined by state intervention and regulation. On the contrary, for instance in Germany or the 
Netherlands, these coordination activities base foremost on a horizontally structured mutual 
agreement system and rely on a non-hierarchical power conception. 
This additional distinction within CME is pivotal to understand how much consensus 
within the political elite is required for the implementation of specific policy proposals. In 
fact, it can be expected that decision-making and implementation processes in France are 
characterized by a higher degree of centralization, and hence less public discussion develops 
as the state has, if necessary, the power to enforce policies unilaterally (Baccaro and Sang-
Hoon 2007; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Regini and Regalia 1997; Molina and Rhodes 2007). 
Thus, in France, modernization strategies traditionally relied on major industrial projects with 
far-reaching state intervention (Thibergien 2007).  
 From the four remaining CME, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be further separat-
ed (Visser and Afonso: 2010). Similar to other continental European economies, the Nether-
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lands and Switzerland face high wage floors and fixed labor costs but – as outliers -– did not 
experience sharply rising unemployment during the 1990s (Iversen and Cusack 2000). To 
achieve this, both countries have relied on a relatively flexible labor market to compensate for 
economic difficulties by extending part-time and temporary employment (Visser and 
Hemerjick 1997; Bonoli and Mach 2000). Moreover, in contrast to other CME, labor move-
ments traditionally play a subordinate role and business interests are dominated by the large 
export-oriented companies (Katzenstein 1985). It is therefore expected that Switzerland and 
the Netherlands represent a liberal leaning variation of the general continental political econ-
omies (Schnyder and Heemskerk, 2008). 
 The institutional differences in collective bargaining, business relationships, and state 
intervention can be expected to influence the way different frames are used in the debate on 
employment relations. In other words, this relates to the often-raised claim that values and 
norms have a different substantial meaning among countries (Medrano 2003). In Austria and 
Germany, and most pronounced in France, we can expect social democratic and protectionist 
ideas to be more strongly engraved in the national public spheres. Social and national protec-
tion should thus more forcefully enter the debate on labor market deregulation. In the U.K. 
and a bit less in Switzerland and the Netherlands, by contrast, we should expect that the tone 
of the debate should be more heavily leaning to liberal frames highlighting the necessity for 
deregulation. 
POLITICAL ACTORS’ PREFERENCES 
 Beside the influence of the national context on the overall framing of labor market 
debates, we also expect the framing strategies to diverge between different interest representa-
tives. However, before the framing strategies are explored, it has to be clariﬁed which actor 
types inhabit the debate on employment relations, since a simpliﬁcation of the multitude of 
statements by conﬂating them to actor types heavily preconditions the interpretation of empir-
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ical ﬁndings. Table 3 lists the actor types and how they will be used in the analyses. 
[table 4 about here] 
The classiﬁcation starts with the very broad distinction between public authority actors, 
interest groups, parties, and corporations. The public authority actors include international 
governmental organizations like the World Trade Organization, European Union actors, as 
well as administrative bodies. Interest groups are divided into trade unions and employer as-
sociations. The latter category also comprises the professional organizations, which had too 
few statements to be collapsed into an own category. With respect to the trade unions, private 
sector unions (including peak unions) are distinguished from public sector unions. This fol-
lows our theoretical argumentation regarding the different preferences on the left, since we 
expect that public sector unions more follow a strategy to defend the losers. In a similar vein, 
peak employer associations and white collar organizations, which are expected to pursue a 
mainstream strategy, are separated from small business associations and farmer organizations. 
Corporations, ﬁnally, are differentiated into public enterprises and multinational corporations. 
 Depending on the political constituency whose interests they represent, these actors can 
be expected to raise and use different frames. More specifically, we argue that the structure of 
political debates on employment relations entails two political divides shaping the patterns 
justifications. To begin with, the traditional left-right divide can be expected to have retained 
important explanatory power. Even though many scholars argue that it has developed merely 
into a valence issue (Dalton et al. 1984, Kitschelt 1994, Hardin 2000), it is evident that the 
ideological antagonism between labor and capital still divides today’s politics at least to some 
extent (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Apart from the opposition between state and market this 
divide concerns also the characteristics of de-commodification3 policies, and split labor, i.e. 
                                                 
3 Esping-Anderson (1998) defines de-commodification as social policies, which were adopted by the welfare 
states to ensure workers’ pay against traditional risks, i.e. sickness, injury and unemployment. Hence, de-
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unions, left parties and public interest groups (social movements and charity organizations), 
favoring highly redistributive policies, and capital, i.e. right parities, employer’s organizations 
and international firms, which prefer means tested benefit structures (Esping-Andersen 1998 
and 1996). 
 However, since the ideological left-right conflict is not as encompassing as it once was, 
it gets cross-cut by a more recent divide which emerged in consequence to far-reaching socio-
economic transformations such as globalization4 and post-industrialization5 (Bonoli 2005 and 
2006, Häusermann 2010, Kriesi et al. 2008; Esping-Anderson 2009). In brief, the labor-
market related interests of the economic winners of the last few decades are pitted against the 
needs of the losers. The decisive political dilemma for the politics of employment relations 
lies between claims for more deregulation and liberalization of the national economy to sus-
tain the winners benefits and the increase of social and national protective policy solutions to 
shelter the losers.  
 Hence, as a consequence to these major structural shifts, we can expect that economic 
preferences have become more complex within the left as well as the right block (Häuser-
mann 2009; Fossati 2011). Following Kriesi et al. (2006 and 2008: 4-5), economic winners 
are best conceptualized as having sufficient exit options in terms of their employment situa-
tion. The pivotal determinant is the level of marketable skills, since a high educational at-
tainment guarantees an individuals’ successful economic mobility even in highly flexible and 
internationalized labor markets (Oesch 2006). These marketable skills, which are captured in 
the case of Schwander and Haeusermann (2009) by occupational profiles, allow to capture 
stable political preferences. Occupational profiles can be seen as a composite concept of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
commodifying policies were introduced to decrease the dependence of employees and their families from the 
(labor) market (Schwartz 2001).  
4 Understood as the increase in cultural diversity, political integration, and the cross-border flows of trade, ser-
vices and capital (Held et al. 1999). 
5 Defined as the upswing of the tertiary sector, the encompassing entry of women into the workforce, and the 
mounting pressure on the welfare state in an era of “permanent austerity“, i.e. demographic aging combined with 
slow economic growth (Pierson 1996 and 2001). 
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individuals’ employment status derived from the skill-level, the protection guaranteed by 
work contracts, and the work logic of jobs (see Oesch 2006).6 Mainstream actors represent the 
winners. Overall, as defined by the combination or of all three characteristics capturing the 
occupational profiles these will thus favor further deregulation and employ a mainly liberal 
framing strategy. Challengers, in contrast, resort to protectionist and social democratic frames 
to justify policy measures that shelter the losers. Depending on the country and time-specific 
context, some actors of course can change their strategy from mainstream to challenging, as it 
for example is the case with social democratic parties (Rueda 2006). The distinctions of a 
political left and right as well as a mainstream and its challengers leads to four ideal-typical 
framing strategies which constitute the expectations for the actor-related analyses (see table 2). 
[table 2 about here] 
 Pursuing the flexicurity approach, left mainstream actors are expected to mobilize ideo-
logically left-oriented but high skilled winners. Thus, these actors can be expected to favor 
more flexible labor market measures, if an effective social security net can be maintained. 
Social investment policies such as activation schemes or education promoting measures are 
the preferred means by these actors to which the third-way social democratic parties and pub-
lic sector unions are expected to belong.  
The second category summarizes traditional left approaches, which have in common that they 
try to protect the economic losers by means of strict de-commodifying measures and protec-
tionist economic policies. Private sector unions, public interest groups (charities and alter-
globalization movements), as well as communist and radical socialist parties are expected to 
use this framing strategy. 
 
                                                 
6 Oesch (2006) distinguishes between four different work logics: self-employed, technical, organizational or 
interpersonal service. 
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 Third, the neoliberal strategy should be preferred by representatives of economic win-
ners which lean to the political right, which includes peak employers associations, liberal and 
Christian democratic/Conservative parties, multinational corporations as well as experts. 
Their constituency mainly entails high-skilled employees working in internationalized 
branches. Accordingly, this group opposes redistribution and costly welfare state measures, 
while it is in favor of enhancing competitiveness by means of laissez faire solutions, i.e. liber-
al frames in combination with a strong preference for deregulation should be characteristic for 
these actors. In line with their constant push to deepen the European Single Market, we fur-
ther expect public administrations, EU and IGO actors as well as public enterprises using 
preferably this framing strategy (Lehmkuhl 2006: 149, Howarth, 2006; Thatcher, 2007). 
 Finally, we have a protectionist framing strategy, which is characterized by a right-
oriented ideological stance and a tendency to protect the national losers from the effects of 
globalizing labor markets. This kind of policy solutions are generally characterized by social 
policy measures relying on strict deservingness criteria and means-tested benefits. Small 
business associations and radical populist parties are anticipated to pursue the strategy to 
combine a protectionist but at the same time liberal framing strategy. 
DESIGNING THE INQUIRY 
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the framing on employment relations, a com-
parative newspaper content analysis was conducted in Austria, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and the U.K.7 These six economies allow us to study the impact of a va-
riety of historical pathways of economic development. The analyses rely on data from quality 
newspapers, detailing the frames employed in employment relations over the three years from 
2004 to 2006. The newspapers include Le Monde (F), The Times (GB), the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (D), the NRC Handelsblad (NL), Die Presse (A) and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (CH). 
                                                 
7 This content analysis data set was established by the author and his collaborators in the research project Na-
tional Political Change in a Globalizing World (see Kriesi et al., 2008). 
15 
 
Given the fact that, due to the heavy workload of content analyses, only one media title could 
be considered, quality newspapers were chosen for conceptual reasons since they are particu-
larly suitable to study public debates. They remain the leading medium of political coverage. 
And, in this role, quality newspapers both report the debates in the most detailed manner and 
inﬂuence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news organizations (Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave, 2008; Reinemann, 2003). 
The single instances of framing were identiﬁed using the Core Sentence Approach 
(CSA). If a policy statement of a relevant actor is found in a text segment, this segment is 
reduced to its most basic structure (a core sentence) that contains only the subject (actor), the 
object (issue), the direction of the relationship between subject and object (polarity), and the 
justification(s) of the relationship (frame(s)). The polarity is always quantiﬁed using a scale 
ranging from -1 to +1, where -1 means opposition and 1 means support of economic liberali-
zation, with three intermediary positions indicating a vague or ambiguous relationship. By 
frames, the problem deﬁnition an actor gives when taking a policy position is meant. Since 
actors regularly back their policy positions in public debates with multiple frames (Lerch and 
Schwellnus, 2006, p. 307), the coding of up to ﬁve frames per core sentence was allowed. The 
example in Table 2 illustrates the coding procedure. This core sentence refers to Blair’s sup-
port of unspeciﬁc labor market reforms, which is complemented by a social protection frame 
(“in order to tackle record unemployment”) as well as a prosperity frame (“in order to tackle 
[...] sluggish growth”).  
[table 3 about here] 
To reduce the effort of time and costs, a two-step sampling strategy was performed: 
First, the relevant events in each country were identiﬁed using various yearbooks (Keesing’s 
World Record of Events, Facts on File World News Digest Yearbook etc.) as well as the an-
nual reviews of the newspapers in our sample. These lists formed the basis for an extensive 
16 
 
keyword list for each country, helping us to electronically ﬁnd potentially relevant articles in 
the newspaper databases. Second, a chronological sample of approximately the same number 
of articles per country was drawn. A chronological sampling tracks the frequency distribution 
of relevant articles and therefore captures the peaks and troughs in the debate. Subsequently, 
given the still time-consuming coding procedure, at most the ﬁrst twenty core sentences of 
each article were coded. In sum, the data collection yielded a total of 2021 frames, which 
were aggregated to the six frame categories as illustrated by table A.1 in the appendix. 
Comparisons of these CSA data with data from expert judgments, party manifesto cod-
ings, and mass surveys, suggest that the external validity is given (Helbling and Tresch, 2011). 
Furthermore, the data source are solely editorial articles. In contrast to paid media content, 
op-eds and letters to the editor, the central aspect of these documents is the processing of in-
formation. And since the coding procedure only allows the annotation of the pure actor state-
ments, the bias induced by the journalistic processing of the information was further curtailed. 
THE STRUCTURE OF FRAMING ON EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS  
 To provide a broad overview of the content analysis data, table 5 shows the frame em-
phasis and frame polarities with respect to the public debate on labor market issues. On the 
one hand, the table indicates the overall distribution of both the higher level and fine-grained 
frame categories in percentages (frame emphasis). This shows which frames are preferred to 
justify statements related to employment relations. On the other hand, the overall direction for 
the different frame categories is indicated (frame polarity). Frame polarities show whether a 
frame is predominantly used with supporting or opposing statements with regards to labor 
market reforms. A positive polarity always means support for more deregulation, i.e. policies 
that induce a liberalization of employment relation or a privatization of labor market institu-
tions. 
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 Note that the frame emphasis and polarity are always calculated using article weights. 
This accounts for imbalances caused by the selection of articles. In fact, the CSA data, i.e., 
core sentence statements derived from newspaper articles, statistically behave like survey data 
sampled at two levels, e.g., the country and individual level. In such data sets, the basic as-
sumption of equal changes for individuals or statements to get into the sample is violated be-
cause the countries have different population sizes and the articles contain different numbers 
of core sentences.8 Thus, the data need to be aggregated using probability weights on the level 
of articles. 
[table 5 about here] 
 As far as the emphasis is concerned, liberal frames are clearly most often used as argu-
ments to justify statements on labor market policies. With 46 percentage points they account 
for almost half of all frames. More precisely, prosperity related frames are the most important 
category with a relative frequency of 36 percentage points. Social democratic frames amount 
to about one third of all frames used. Especially social security related arguments are heavily 
used with 27.3 percentage points. The use of these rather pragmatic frames clearly outstrips 
the more universalistic arguments related to economic fairness. Neomercantilist justifications 
are somewhat less important, making up for 19.8 percent of all frames. Here, the frequency of 
using arguments related to intervention and protection is roughly equal. 
 Turning to the polarity of the frames used in the debate on labor market issues, the total 
polarity indicates that the overall climate over all countries reflects support of deregulation 
(+0.11). While prosperity, protection, and, a bit less, intervention are clearly used with state-
ments in favor of more flexible labor markets (+0.35, +0.30, and +0.15, respectively), justifi-
cations pointing to economic freedom have a positive polarity so close to zero that a the direc-
                                                 
8 To illustrate the implications, one can assume an actor with ten statements which all stem from the same article. 
This salience is easily achieved if an article reports only a little bit more detailed about this actor’s position. 
Further, let’s assume a second actor with ten statements, but this time from ten different articles. These ten 
statements should be given more weight since the actor appeared at very different events. 
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tion should not be interpreted at all. A polarity of 0.04 means that positive and negative 
statements almost cancel each other out and the actors are merely ambivalent with respect to 
this frame category. Fairness and social security, by contrast, are heavily connected to the 
opposition of labor market deregulation (–0.23 and –0.18). Both social democratic frame cat-
egories thus countervail the distinctly positive polarities related to prosperity and protection 
frames. 
HOW FRAME POLARITIES ALIGN 
 After this descriptive overview on the overall distribution of frames, the analysis pro-
ceeds with the question of how the actors’ frame polarities are structured into underlying di-
mensions of the frame competition on employment relations. To this aim, a factor analysis 
was applied on the frame polarities as calculated over the 14 actor categories and six countries. 
This yields a potential number of observations of 84. Yet, since not all combinations are pre-
sent in the data and actors with less than five statements were not considered, the final num-
ber of observations is 61. On this data, the eigenvalue test as well as the parallel analysis in 
figure A.1 (appendix) both indicate a two-factor solution as optimal representation of the 
structure of the frame polarities, which is shown in table 6. 
[table 6 about here] 
 The polarities of the two liberal frames load higher on the first factor (highlighted in 
bold), which therefore can be regarded as conflict dimension separating actors emphasizing 
economic growth as priority with respect to employment relations. Yet not only free market 
framing strategies–prosperity with 0.31 and economic freedom with 0.54–, but also the fram-
ing related to state-led development strategies align on this dimension, since intervention has 
a higher factor loading here as well (0.76). The second factor is build around the combination 
of social democratic frames and protectionist justifications. Fairness has a factor loading of 
0.56, social security loads with 0.68, and slightly less clear, protection is located with 0.24 on 
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this dimension. Since the common denominator of these three categories is protection–in a 
social or territorial sense–, the dimension is named securing. Yet this also means that the tra-
ditional left and protectionist framing approaches are not really distinct from each other, since 
their anticipated dominant framing strategies actually coincide. 
 The following analyses build on the results of the factor analysis. More precisely, the 
factor scores of the actors or their emphasis of the two dimensions will be used to explore the 
framing strategies in detail. 
FRAME EMPHASIS BY ACTORS AND COUNTRIES 
 Frame polarities are only one important indicator for the actors’ framing strategy. Be-
sides the use of the different frame categories for the justification of support and opposition to 
labor market deregulation, it is further crucial how the actors emphasize frames. This strategic 
aspect involves the manipulation of the salience of specific frames in order to shape the mean-
ing of employment relation policies. Figure 1 shows the frame emphasis of the actors on the 
securing dimension in decreasing and the growth dimensions in increasing order. While the 
thick lines indicate the median, the boxes indicate the distance between the lower and upper 
quartile of the respective actor’s frame emphasis. On the one hand, this allows to interpret the 
consistence of the actors, i.e. the length of the plots show how much the single actors differ 
from each other in the single countries. On the other hand, the position of the median points to 
the general emphasis strategy of this actor. 
[figure 1 about here] 
 Many left actors clearly insist on securing. Communists/radical socialists, private sector 
unions, and public interest groups substantially lean to the emphasis of securing frames. The 
public sector unions, social democrats, however, show a more balanced frame emphasis strat-
egy since their median frame use is located close to 0.5 and the boxplots are not substantively 
skewed towards one direction. This gets confirmed by the regression coefficients for the actor 
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categories with respect to the emphasis of securing (table A.2 in the appendix), which exactly 
reveal the actors that use securing more often and can thus be perceived as challengers. 
Communists/radical socialists, private and public sector unions, public interest groups, as well 
as small business associations all significantly deviate from public administrations. The left 
challengers, who represent the interests of the losers, insist on securing are thus reinforced by 
the small business associations, an actor which was expected to be protectionist.  
 As for the remaining actors, the experts and the Christian democrats/conservatives show 
a similar, heterogeneous pattern of their frame emphasis. The single country actors of this 
category are widely distributed, as the spread out boxplots indicate. More consistent are the 
two types of corporations included into the analyses (multinational corporations and public 
enterprises), the peak employer associations, the liberal and right wing populist parties as well 
as the public authorities (IGO and EU actors as well as public administrations). These actors 
share a rather consistent emphasis of growth related frames and hence by tendency represent 
the winners. This was mostly expected, except for the radical populist right, which do not 
stress economic protection but according to Kitschelt’s “winning formula” is rather expected 
to support liberal frames. The present result might hence be due to the salience of the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP), which traditionally deviates from other right-wing populists with re-
spect to its economic liberalism. Since the SVP is the only radical populist party besides the 
Austrian Alliance for the Future and Freedom Party, this probably shifts the frame emphasis 
of this actor category to insistence of growth. 
 Figure 2 shows the same measure for the countries as figure 1 for the actors. The box-
plots indicate the distribution of the respective actors in a country in terms of the emphasis of 
the two dimensions. Obviously, there is only one value for the European and international 
level, since all statements of IGO and EU actors were combined. Besides the European and 
international level, the U.K. strongly emphasizes growth. Table A.2 in the appendix addition-
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ally shows that only the actors in the U.K. significantly deviate by their lower emphasis of 
securing and, correspondingly, a stronger insistence on economic growth. As expected, the 
U.K. thus stands out in terms of the general framing patterns. 
[figure 2 about here] 
 The distributions in Germany and Austria, although the median values heavily differ, 
resemble each other in being stretched out on the whole spectrum. In these two countries, 
actors therefore differ most in terms of frame emphasis. Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
which were anticipated to be rather liberal-leaning countries in the country sample of the 
study, are indeed characterized by a median which is above 0.5 for the emphasis of economic 
growth and a distribution which clearly leans to the right of the graph. France, in contrast, 
leans to the emphasis of securing, both with respect to the distribution and the median of the 
actors’ frame emphasis. In sum, the country differences with regard to the emphasis of differ-
ent aspects on employment relations–with the exception of Austria–reflect the expectations. 
WHICH ACTORS SHARE THEIR FRAME USAGE? 
 The remaining analysis combines frame polarities and frame emphasis to identify spe-
cific frame usage by the actors in the public debate on employment relations. More precisely, 
figure 4 presents the results of a cluster analysis on the factor loadings as well as the relative 
frequency of the two frame dimensions for the identified clusters. First, the appropriate num-
ber of clusters was chosen according to the sum of squares within the groups of different clus-
ter solutions (see figure A.2 in the appendix). After the five cluster model, which was chosen, 
the sum of squares decelerate markedly. Second, the average factor loadings for the five clus-
ters are indicated by the coordinates of the pie chart centers. Third, the relative importance of 
the five clusters in terms of statements made in the debate is shown by the size of the pie 
charts, whose sectors present the ratio between frames related to growing (white) and securing 
(grey), respectively. The affiliation of the single actors to the clusters, finally, is indicated in 
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table A.3 in the appendix. 
[figure 4 about here] 
 First, two clusters (one and five) can be identified that resemble each other in terms of 
frame polarities but differ with regards their frame emphasis. The difference in terms of frame 
emphasis is explained by the fact that in the fifth cluster, exclusively leftist actors are present, 
which leads to a high share of securing frames. The first cluster, by contrast, encompasses 
actors from both the left and right, which rises the share of growth frames. Both cluster use 
securing and growth frames in combination with support of labor market deregulation, which 
can be perceived as pursuing a flexicurity approach. As expected, these clusters, among others, 
entail the Swiss, German, and Dutch social democrats (see table A.3) and the public sector 
unions from Austria, France, and Switzerland. Yet, also actors who were expected to apply a 
neoliberal framing strategy belong to these clusters, for example, the multinational corpora-
tions in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the Christian democrats/conservatives in Austria, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K., as well as the public enterprises from the Nether-
lands and the U.K. Flexicurity thus seems to be the preferred approach, not only for the main-
stream left, but also for a big part of the mainstream right. But also the private sector unions 
in Switzerland and the U.K., hypothesized as traditional leftist, and the small business associ-
ations in Austria and Switzerland, anticipated as protectionists, belong to these two clusters. 
 The fourth cluster is the second biggest in terms of statements in the debate, but only a 
restricted number of actors is affiliated to it. This cluster uses securing with a negative conno-
tation but growth with a positive polarity. Together with the strong emphasis of growth relat-
ed aspects, this matches the neoliberal framing category. As expected, the EU and IGO actors, 
the peak employer associations in France, Netherlands, and Switzerland, the experts in Swit-
zerland, and the multinational corporations in France and the U.K. belong to this cluster. 
However, in the U.K., it also includes the left mainstream actors (public sector unions and 
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social democrats).  
 Since protectionist and traditional left approaches could be kept apart in the factor anal-
ysis, the third cluster is a combination of the two. Securing is seen in a positive light, while 
growth frames are related to the opposition to labor market reforms. In addition, the actors 
adhering to this cluster heavily emphasize securing aspects. The communists/radical socialists 
in Austria and the Netherlands (the only representatives from this party family that made it 
into the analyses), private sector unions in Austria and Germany, the radical populist parties 
in Austria, the public interest groups in Switzerland, and the small business associations in 
Germany and the Netherlands belong to this cluster. There are some few unexpected classifi-
cations such as the public administrations in Austria, the social democrats in France, as well 
as the experts in France and the U.K.  
 The last cluster (two) is mainly build by actors which have been expected to pursue a 
neoliberal approach. But beside their emphasis of growth-related arguments and the negative 
connotation of securing frames, which would have matched the neoliberal approach, they also 
perceive the growth aspects as negative. Namely, the public administrations from the Nether-
lands and the U.K., the Christian democrats/conservatives in France and Germany, the peak 
employer associations in France, the Netherlands, and the U.K., as well as the public enter-
prises in France and Switzerland. 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this contribution was to explore the frame usage of the different ac-
tors engaging in the politics of employment relations in six west-European countries. In fact, 
as it becomes evident from the major labor market reforms currently occurring overall Europe, 
such as the Harz IV reform in Germany or the Universal Credit reform in the U.K., this policy 
domain is undergoing significant changes as a consequence of the transformation of socio-
economic context induced by globalization, tertiarization and feminization.  
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The analyses frame emphasis and frame polarity results in two framing strategies, the 
first being a combination of the social-democratic “social protection” and “fairness” frames 
with the neo-mercantilist “protection” category. The second general frame instead is com-
posed by the liberal “prosperity” and “economic freedom” frames with the neoliberal “inter-
vention”. This broad picture of two competing framing patterns corresponds to the distinction 
between a political mainstream emphasizing economic growth and its challengers insisting on 
aspects of securing. 
Moreover, given the different ideological traditions characterizing the European coun-
tries and according to the analytical framework of the comparative political economy litera-
ture, it is likely that the national pathways diverge with respect to the overall framing of de-
regulating labor market reforms. This argument was tested against the literature, which in-
stead claims that, overall, European countries converge on a neoliberal reform trajectory. Our 
empirical findings support the former view, and we could show that the countries in our sam-
ple, except for Austria, correspond to the typology developed on the basis of the VoC litera-
ture. More precisely, the results picture that in the CMEs Germany and France overall secur-
ing frames prevail, whereas in the traditional Liberal Market Economy (U.K.) growth frames 
are emphasized most. The small export-oriented economies Switzerland and the Netherland 
are, according to our expectations, slightly more liberally oriented than the other CMEs. Only, 
the expectations for Austria could not be underpinned, this country results to be more liberal 
than expected. 
Furthermore, the empirical results show that the frame usage also differs conspicuous-
ly between political actors depending both on their political orientation and on the clientele 
they serve, i.e. either the winners or losers of globalization and post-industrialization. One the 
one hand, left challengers such as communists/radical socialists and private sector unions as 
well as right challengers such as small business associations emphasize foremost securing 
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frames. On the other hand, right mainstream actors, such as public enterprises or public ad-
ministration use foremost growth frames, accommodating the globalization winners.  
Interestingly, the cluster analysis shows that depending on the country at stake not on-
ly social-democrats prefer a flexicurity approach but also liberal actors as for instance the 
multinational corporations in Austria, Germany and Switzerland as well as the Christian dem-
ocrats/conservatives in Austria and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the neoliberal cluster com-
prehends not only the peak employer’s associations in France, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land but also for instance the Labour party in the U.K. This rather diversified picture of clus-
ter compositions is hence an indication that analyses not only of framing strategies but also of 
political preferences more generally should be cautiously conducted, since rather complex 
interaction patterns between actor preferences and country legacies exist.  
The findings show as well that the differences are not only due to the type of frame 
emphasis but also on the consistency of the political actors frame use across countries. For 
instance Christian-democratic parties, for instance, are rather centrist, i.e. use both security 
and growth frames, but their polarity is very variable across countries. Liberal parties, instead, 
are very consistent across different countries. Here, one possible explanation could be that the 
strategic configuration of the party system has an influence on the emphasized framing, i.e. 
that political actors frame strategically and not corresponding to their intrinsic preferences. 
Finally, similarly to testing the hypothesis whether country trajectories diverge, it 
could also be analyzed whether the degree of coordination with supra and international organ-
izations, such as the European Union and its European Employment Strategy framework or 
the International Labour Office, influence the frame usage at the national level. In fact, the 
degree to which a country is integrated into the supranational lawmaking or the elaboration of 
international guidelines could also have a significant impact on the national employment rela-
tion framing. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Allocation of Justifications as Coded to the Frame Categories 
Prosperity 
Innovation; economic prosperity in general (of individuals, companies or sectors); wealth in general; 
free trade; liberalization; globalization; investments; profits; corporate management; competitiveness; 
research and development; economic progress. 
Economic freedom 
Economic self-interest; entrepreneurial success; blessing of capitalism and free markets; economic 
liberal ideas; freedom of economic activity in general; neo-liberal ideology; individual responsibility; 
entrepreneurial freedom; freedom of choice. 
Intervention 
Market failure; fiscal policy; bureaucracy; political efficiency; international relations; public goods 
(education, infrastructure etc.); interventionism in general; economic delinquency (clandestine em-
ployment, black market etc.); delinquency in general; security in general; corruption; political stabil-
ity; inflation policy. 
Protection 
Protectionism; relocation abroad and foreign take-overs; loss of traditions; answer to globalization; 
benefit for domestic or local business; national identity; nationalism; national autonomy; national 
sovereignty; national interest in general; xenophobia; immigration. 
Social protection 
Employment protection; labor disputes and strikes; reducing unemployment; job quality; occupation-
al health; social dumping; stakeholder interests; social security in general; consumer protection; indi-
vidual well-being in general; labor relations and union agreements. 
Fairness 
Human dignity; democratic and participatory principles; equality of opportunity; poverty relief (as a 
moral duty); cultural diversity; gender equality; minority rights; exploitation; peace; solidarity with 
developing countries; public welfare; noncommercial values; humanitarian law; social justice in gen-
eral; socialist ideology. 
 
Figure A.1: Scree Test for the Number of 
Factors with Respect to the Frame Polarities 
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Table A.2: Results of OLS Regression on Emphasis of Securing 
 
Estimates Std. Err. Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept 0.347 0.104 *** 
Actors (ref=Public administrations) 
Christian democrats/conservatives 0.075 0.120 n.s. 
Communists/radical socialists 0.509 0.168 *** 
IGO and EU actors -0.107 0.222 n.s. 
Experts 0.115 0.120 n.s. 
Liberals 0.134 0.168 n.s. 
Multinational corporations -0.034 0.120 n.s. 
Peak employer assoc. 0.021 0.120 n.s. 
Private sector unions 0.448 0.132 *** 
Public interest groups 0.314 0.168 * 
Public sector unions 0.383 0.120 *** 
Radical populist right -0.021 0.168 n.s. 
Small business assoc. 0.270 0.145 ** 
Social democrats 0.175 0.126 n.s. 
Public enterprises -0.080 0.126 n.s. 
Countries (ref=Austria) 
Switzerland -0.070 0.083 n.s. 
Germany 0.128 0.091 n.s. 
France 0.096 0.100 n.s. 
Netherlands -0.046 0.090 n.s. 
U.K. -0.212 0.090 ** 
N 61 
  Adjusted R2 0.44 
  Notes: F-statistic: 3.483 on 19 and 41 DF,  p-value: 0.0004; Sig-
nificance codes:  ***=0.001,**=0.01,*=0.05. 
 
Figure A.2: Kmeans Clustering: Within Groups 
Sum of Squares by Number of Cluster 
 
Notes: Selected model: 5 cluster. 
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Table A.3: Actor Classification by Cluster Analysis 
Cluster Austria France Germany 
Nether-
lands 
Switzer-
land U.K. other 
1 Flexicu-
rity type 1 
(+) sec 
(+) 
growth 
 
chriscon, 
expert, 
multi, 
smallbus 
– 
admin, 
multi, 
socdem 
chriscon, 
liberal, 
socdem, 
pubent 
admin, 
chriscon, 
liberal, 
multi, 
radpop, 
smallbus 
chriscon, 
expert, 
pubent 
– 
2 Status 
quo 
(-) sec 
(-) growth 
– 
chriscon, 
peak, 
pubent 
chriscon 
admin, 
multi, 
peak, 
pubunion 
pubent 
admin, 
peak, 
pubint 
– 
3 Left 
protec-
tionist 
(+/-) sec 
(-) growth 
 
admin, 
comsoc, 
privunion, 
radpop, 
pubent 
expert, 
socdem 
privunion, 
pubunion, 
smallbus 
comsoc, 
pubunion, 
smallbus 
pubint expert – 
4 Neo-
liberal 
(-) sec 
(+) 
growth 
peak multi peak  
expert, 
peak 
multi, 
pubunion, 
socdem 
IGO and 
EU 
5 Flexicu-
rity type 2 
(+/- sec) 
(+/-) 
growth 
pubunion pubunion experts – 
privunion, 
pubunion, 
socdem 
privunion – 
Notes: Labels: admin=Public administrations, chriscon=Christian democrats/Conservatives, com-
soc=Communists/Radical socialists, expert=Experts, IGO and EU=IGO and Eu actors, liberal=Liberals, mul-
ti=Multinational corporations, peak=Peak employer associations, pubent=Public enterprises, pubunion=Public 
sector union, privunion=Private sector union, radpop=Radical populist right, smallbus=Small business associa-
tions, socdem=Social democrats. 
 
 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Conceptualization of Framing Categories 
Ideology Frame label Description 
Liberal Prosperity Emphasis of Innovation, economic performance and growth  Economic freedom Insisting on individual and entrepreneurial freedom 
Neomercantilist  
 
Intervention Need for the regulation of markets 
Protection  Fostering traditional production and national wealth 
Social Democratic Social Security Demanding redistribution and employment protection Fairness  Respect of social rights and egalitarian values 
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Table 2: Framing Approaches 
  Left Right 
Mainstream  Flexicurity Neoliberal 
Challengers Traditional left  Protectionist 
 
Table 3: CSA Coding example 
“Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency, hoping to make labor markets 
more ﬂexible in order to tackle record unemployment and sluggish growth across the continent.” 
(The Times, May 31 2005, Battle for the heart of Europe) 
Subject Polarity Issue Frames 
Blair +1 Labor market reform Social protection/Prosperity 
 
 
Table 4: Actor Classiﬁcation as Used in the Analyses 
Basic Categories Refinements 
Public authorities IGO and EU actors Public administrations 
Interest groups 
Public sector unions 
Private sector unions 
Peak employer associations and white collar organizations 
Small business associations and farmer organizations 
Party Families 
Communists and radical socialists 
Greens 
Social democrats 
Liberals 
Christian democrats and conservatives 
Radical populist right 
External actors 
Multinational corporations 
Public enterprises 
Experts 
Public interest groups 
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Table 5: Frame Emphasis and Frame Polarity 
  Emphasis Polarity 
Liberal 46.0 0.28 
      Prosperity 36.0 0.35 
      Economic freedom 10.0 0.04 
Neomercantilist 19.8 0.21 
      Intervention 11.7 0.15 
      Protection 8.1 0.30 
Social democratic 34.2 -0.19 
      Fairness 6.9 -0.23 
      Social security 27.3 -0.18 
Total % / polarity 100 0.11 
N 2021 
Notes: Article and country weights applied. Framing = percent-
ages; polarity = averages. 
 
Table 6: Results of Factor Analysis on Frame Po-
larities on Employment Relations 
 
Growth 
(Factor1) 
Securing 
(Factor2) 
Unique- 
ness 
Prosperity 0.31 0.20 0.86 
Economic freedom 0.54 0.19 0.68 
Intervention 0.76 0.00 0.42 
Protection 0.08 0.24 0.94 
Fairness 0.02 0.56 0.69 
Social security 0.24 0.68 0.48 
Eigenvalue 1.93 1.17  
Explained variance 17% 15%  
Notes: Article and country weights applied for all calcula-
tions. N= 
 
Figure 1: Frame Emphasis by Actor 
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Figure 2: Frame Emphasis by Country 
 
 
Figure 4: Frame Polarity (Factor Scores), Relative Importance and Frame Emphasis of Clus-
ters  
 
Notes: Pie chart centers=Polarity on the two Factors, Size of the pie charts=Relative frequency, Pie 
charts=Frame emphasis (white=Growth,grey=Securing). 
